Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00342

GERALD PAUL HERSHFELDT, Plaintiff, v.

CARLEEN JOHNSTON, individually and in her official capacity; JENNIFER BRANT, individually and in her official capacity; TIMOTHY J. JASHINSKY, individually and in his official capacity; CINDY LUCERO, individually and in her official capacity; WENDY BATTS, individually and in her official capacity; ARTHUR J. SPICCIATI, individually and in his official capacity; LARRY BOYD, individually and in his official capacity; JANE RODIG, individually and in her official capacity; HEATHER O’HAYRE, in her official capacity; MICHELLE BARNES, in her official capacity; LAURIE GILL, in her official capacity; LARIMER COUNTY, COLORADO,

Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

  1. This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, to remedy a decade of unconstitutional child support enforcement executed in the total absence of a valid judicial predicate and the willful, ongoing suppression of Plaintiff’s creditworthiness in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2.
  2. Plaintiff challenges the executive enforcement methods employed by state and county officials acting under color of law. This action does not seek to vacate, review, reverse, or modify any state court domestic relations judgment.
  3. Rooker-Feldman Disclaimer: Plaintiff does not ask this federal Court to overturn a divorce decree. Plaintiff seeks redress for executive property seizures and liberty deprivations executed without a lawful judicial predicate - constitutional injuries independent of any state court judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar this action. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
  4. The foundation of this suit is the state court’s own official record. A June 10, 2015 minute order in Larimer County Case No. 2015DR000229 explicitly states that the court was “UNABLE TO ENTER SUPPORT ORDERS AS WE ARE MISSING SSN FOR CHILDREN.” See Exhibit 1.
  5. On January 13, 2026, the Larimer County Court Records Department provided a written administrative admission that it could not produce the 2015 support order because it “does not exist” in the official court file. See Exhibit 2. On that same date, the state district court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration on procedural time-bar grounds, refusing to address the substantive absence of the foundational order. State remedies are exhausted.
  6. Despite the documented absence of a valid judicial predicate, Defendants exercised their administrative discretion to execute ex parte enforcement actions, unlawfully seizing tens of thousands of dollars from Plaintiff’s wages and accounts, deliberately suspending his driver’s license on four occasions without a constitutionally required ability-to-pay hearing, and willfully furnishing false information to all three major consumer ⁰reporting agencies for over a decade.
  7. These unconstitutional customs and statutory violations directly caused 527 documented days of homelessness, the destruction of Plaintiff’s professional livelihood, and the ongoing suppression of his credit to a FICO score of 461.

Magistrate Judge Richard T. Gurley

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

  1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) because Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States - specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
  2. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (4) to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution.
  3. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FCRA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The FCRA claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with the § 1983 constitutional claims, as both arise from the same debt enforcement and false credit reporting conduct of the Defendants.
  4. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to these claims occurred in this District, and the Colorado Defendants reside and perform their official duties within this District.
  5. Standing (Lujan Framework): Plaintiff has suffered a concrete and particularized injury - namely, the unlawful seizure of wages and accounts, the unconstitutional suspension of his driver’s license, 527 days of documented homelessness, and total economic damages estimated at $73,004.42$ - satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). These injuries are directly traceable to Defendants’ automated enforcement without a valid judicial predicate and their willful false credit reporting. A favorable judicial decision will redress these injuries through restitution, injunctive relief, and statutory and compensatory damages.